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Abstract 
Should rational agents take into consideration government policy announcements? A skilled 
agent (an econometrician) could set up a model to combine the following two pieces of 
information in order to anticipate the future course of fiscal policy in real-time: (i) the ex-ante 
path of policy as published/announced by the government; (ii) incoming, observed data on 
the actual degree of implementation of ongoing plans. We formulate and estimate empirical 
models for a number of EU countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) to show that 
government (consumption) targets convey useful information about ex-post policy 
developments when policy changes significantly (even if past credibility is low) and when 
there is limited information about the implementation of plans (e.g. at the beginning of a fiscal 
year). In addition, our models are instrumental in unveiling the current course of policy in real 
time. Our approach complements a well-established branch of the literature that finds 
politically motivated biases in policy targets.  
Keywords: policy credibility, fiscal policy, forecasting. 
JEL Classification: C54, H30, H68, E61, E62. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
¿Debería tomar en consideración un analista en su proceso de toma de decisiones los 
anuncios del Gobierno sobre las políticas que implementará en el futuro? Para responder a 
esta pregunta, el analista podría combinar en un modelo la siguiente información: 1) la 
política/objetivo anunciada por el Gobierno y 2) la información disponible sobre las políticas que 
de hecho está implementando el Gobierno. Esta es la aproximación que tomamos en el 
presente trabajo. Formulamos y estimamos modelos empíricos para un conjunto de países de 
la UE (Alemania, Francia, Italia y España) y mostramos que los objetivos oficiales de gasto 
(consumo público) proporcionan información útil sobre la política de gasto (consumo público) 
efectivamente realizada a posteriori en situaciones en las cuales se instrumentan cambios 
significativos en las políticas (incluso cuando el cumplimiento de dichos planes en el pasado fue 
escaso) y cuando hay información limitada sobre el grado de implementación efectiva de los planes 
en curso (esto es, a principios del año presupuestario). Nuestros resultados complementan y 
cualifican una rama muy influyente de la literatura, que tiende a encontrar que los objetivos 
oficiales incorporan sesgos sistemáticos significativos. 
Palabras clave: credibilidad de la política económica, política fiscal, previsión económica. 
Códigos JEL: C54, H30, H68, E61, E62. 
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1 Introduction 
Some recent literature convincingly argues that uncertainty about government policies has 
been detrimental to economic growth over the past few years.1
The uncertainty about fiscal policies in real-time is closely linked to the issue of the 
credibility of government plans.
 In fact, policy-induced 
uncertainty has increased to record levels since the Great Recession. In addition, uncertainty 
about the timing and composition of fiscal consolidations may matter for the success of such 
consolidation (Bi, Leeper and Leith, 2011) and may fundamentally affect medium-term 
macroeconomic projections and thus policy actions designed in reaction to a given perceived 
economic situation (Cimadomo, 2012 and Blanchard and Leith, 2013). 
2 These plans determine specific tax changes and spending 
programmes, and as such shape decisions and actions3 of economic agents. Nevertheless, 
the ability of ex-ante budgetary plans to convey information about the ex post course of fiscal 
policies may be blurred by the presence of political bias and strategic behaviour by 
governments, as shown by a well-established branch of the literature.4 Indeed, a large strand 
of the literature has analyzed from a theoretical and empirical point of view the potential bias 
that the political and institutional process might have on government fiscal policy plans and 
the nature and properties of budgetary deviations from targets. For the case of European 
Union (EU) governments, this literature tends to find empirical evidence in favour of the 
existence of systematic political and institutional biases in revenue forecasting, while the 
evidence for the United States is mixed, depending on the institutional coverage of the 
analysis (Federal government or States).5
In this paper we address the issue of the information content of budgetary plans 
from a real-time perspective. We adopt the point of view of an agent who wishes to obtain an 
informed and independent estimate about the future course of fiscal policy during the year. To 
do so, the agent (econometrician) sets out a model at the quarterly frequency in which all the 
available information is combined: announced (ex-ante) forward-looking government plans, 
and high frequency fiscal data on the implementation of current (ongoing) government plans.
 
6 
7
                                                                            
1. See e.g. Ayhan and Terrones (2012) or Baker and Davis (2012). 
 At each point in time, this approach allows the agent to confront what the government says 
it will do with what the government is actually doing. In this respect we adopt an ex-ante, real-
2. Cowan et al. (2000) argue that the credibility of policy is critical to the success of policy in many areas, ranging from 
monetary policy to patent policy to tax incentives. 
3. Even the late publication of budget laws may impinge on the credibility of plans and penalize the financing costs of the 
government (Andersen, Lassen, and Westh, 2014). 
4. The theoretical literature on the characterization and determinants of policy credibility is quite large. An early survey is provided 
by Persson (1988). On the contribution of bureaucratic effects to policy forecasts see, e.g., Mounts and Sowell (1996). 
5. Some empirical papers that look at the properties and determinants government plans (and international 
organizations’ forecasts) are Blackley and DeBoer (1993), Auerbach (1999), Jonung and Larch (2006), Boylan (2008), 
Dreher et al. (2008), Leal et al. (2008), Beetsma et al. (2009), von Hagen (2010),  Holcombe and Ryvkin (2010), Pina and 
Venes (2011), Frankel (2011), Jong-a-Pin et al. (2012), Frankel and Schreger (2013a, 2013b), Merola and Pérez (2013), 
Cimadomo (2014), and the references quoted therein. 
6. A recent literature in the field of short-term forecasting that has shown that the use of high-frequency fiscal data may 
improve budget forecasting and monitoring. See, e.g. Silvestrini et al. (2008), Pedregal and Pérez (2010), Asimakopoulos 
et al. (2013), Pedregal et al. (2014, and the references quoted therein. 
7. Lundtofte and Leoni (2014) argue that governments are in most cases better informed about the future of the 
macroeconomy than the vast majority of private investors. In the framework of monetary policy, Andersen (1989) 
considers policy announcements from a forward-looking perspective, rather than relying on learning from experience, 
and states conditions under which policy announcements are credible or non-credible. 
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time view, compared to the traditional post-mortem exercise in the related literature that 
dissects the determinants of ex-post budgetary deviations. 
In practical terms, we set out state-of-the-art, mixed-frequencies, time-series factor 
models, along the lines of Camacho and Pérez-Quirós (2010) or Aruoba, Diebold and Scotti 
(2009, 2010). Mixed-frequencies models provide a natural framework to integrate announced 
plans, at the annual frequency, with data on the implementation of the plans, at the quarterly 
frequency. We take government consumption to be the fiscal variable defining policy in our 
empirical exercises, and focus on euro area economies, namely Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain, as all these countries have been recently subject to fiscal consolidation processes but 
with different degrees of intensity.8
Following this approach we show that government targets may convey useful 
information about ex-post policy developments in certain circumstances, in particular when 
policy changes significantly, even if the track record of government plan’s credibility has been 
poor, and when there is limited information about the implementation of plans (e.g. at the 
beginning of a fiscal year). This helps qualifying the above-mentioned, well-established results 
from a related literature that would advise against paying too much attention to policy targets, 
given that they are found to display politically-motivated biases. In addition, our models are 
instrumental to unveil the current course of fiscal policy in real-time, which complement a 
different literature, focused on forecasting, that usually treats government expenses as 
exogenous in macro scenarios because they are considered erratic and difficult to forecast 
(see e.g. Grassi et al., 2014). 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop further the 
main contribution of the paper. In Section 3, we describe the data used. In Section 4, we 
present the models, and in Section 5 the empirical experiments carried out and the main 
results. Section 6 provides some conclusions and policy implications. 
                                                                            
8. In addition, focusing on EU countries has the advantage that EU fiscal rules prescribe the publication of multi-annual 
fiscal plans (that encompass the most recent budget) at the same date, and according to comparable statistical 
standards. 
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2 Learning about the government plan 
At each quarter t of a given year T economic agents observe the government plan gT∆ for 
that very year for a given fiscal variable gT∆ , which denotes the annual rate of growth of 
government consumption. They can also find from official publications the track record of the 
government in living up to its past years’ plans, i.e they can compute the sequence of 
budgetary deviations given by 
 }{ 1
1−=−−
∆−∆=Ψ
TjjTjTT
gg                 (1) 
where the index for years is arbitrarily set to run from year 1 (first year for which a fiscal plan 
is available) to T-1. In a stochastic world, a government that has met its commitments in 
the past would present a sequence TΨ with zero mean, no autocorrelation and low 
variance. It would also be expected that fiscal plans of a government with a poor track 
record (i.e. TΨ  being a sequence with a non-zero mean/biased, or in general not efficient) 
would be assigned a very low weight (historical credibility) by agents when trying to predict 
the future course of policy.  
At the same time, in each quarter t of year T the agent observes the actual historical 
quarterly time series of government consumption, { } IttTt g ∈∆=Φ ,  (where I runs at the 
quarterly frequency over the yearly support 1 to T) and may assess how likely is the annual 
target for the current year gT∆  conditional on that quarterly information. To compute an 
optimal projection of gT∆ at each quarter t of year T, one can optimally combine observed 
data, Tt ,Φ , with forward-looking information (target), gT∆ , conditional on TΨ , and all other 
relevant available information (indicators), in a general model of the form ( )TTTt gF Ψ∆Φ /;,
. The need to combine these two sources of information arises from the fact that the ability of 
the government to force gT∆  to be equal to gT∆  decreases as the quarters within the year 
go by, in particular if the cumulated sequence of quarterly data Tt ,Φ drifts away from the 
annual target. At the same time, if the cumulated sequence of data is assessed to be 
consistent with reaching the target, this would make the agent more confident on gT∆  
irrespective of the track record of TΨ being good or bad.  
Thus, ( )TTTt gF Ψ∆Φ /;,  can be deemed as a learning device to help based 
behavioural decisions. Economic agents can update their whole-year projection every quarter 
to take into account newly revealed data on the actual implementation of the plan. Given the 
standard delays in data publication by most national statistical institutes worldwide, updating 
this learning process might be useful for an analyst even after the calendar year is over, given 
that the final quarterly and annual figures for macro and fiscal aggregates for a given calendar 
year are typically published with a delay of two to three months. 
With this basic framework in mind, we are interested in three baseline cases. First, a 
case in which the economic agent estimates the weighting function/“policy rule” 
( )TTTt gF Ψ∆Φ /;, , to projects gT∆ . Second, a case in which TT ×=Ψ 10  in equation 
(1); this case could be relevant from a real-time point of view not to penalize a newly 
appointed government that aims at starting from scratch with past policy practices, and 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1508 
pursues a given policy, credibly committing to it. Finally, a case in which the agent totally 
disregards the target gT∆  and projects gT∆  only on the basis of observed data on the 
implementation of the plans.  
In the following sections we will be more specific about all aspects of this general setup. 
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3 Some definitions and data issues 
3.1 Government consumption 
In the paper g is quarterly government consumption, as defined by the European System of 
Accounts (ESA 1995). Compared to the prior literature looking at government targets that 
typically edges on annual fiscal deficits this allows us to integrate a macroeconomic 
perspective together with the public finance one. Indeed, g is a direct demand component of 
GDP, which represents about 15%-20% of GDP in advanced economies, and as such tends 
to receive specific and detailed attention when governments prepare their macroeconomic 
projections. At the same time, given the core role of GDP in national statistical systems, the 
availability of quarterly data is much richer than for standard public finance variables, in 
particular as regards the decomposition of nominal values between volumes and prices, as 
well as the availability of seasonally-adjusted data. Due to the latter, most studies looking at 
the macroeconomic effects of “government spending shocks” have mainly paid attention to 
government consumption.9
3.2 Data issues 
 In addition, g is the only fiscal variable for which EU governments 
are obliged to publish their yearly target in both real (value) and nominal (volume) terms, in the 
framework of the publication of annual Stability and Convergence Programme (SP). 
The real-time dimension of our study and the quarterly frequency adopted, introduce the 
need to fine-tune the information set that would have been available to an analysts at each 
quarter. Available high frequency variables, notwithstanding, are heterogeneous in our case of 
interest, and tend to be related either to the real part of g, to the price part, or to the 
interaction of both (nominal terms). This is due to the fact that g covers, among others, 
spending in goods and services that are provided, broadly speaking, at no cost for the user: 
defense, judicial system, education, health, etc. In order to find suitable indicators of these 
activities, it is important to acknowledge that in National Accounts a great deal of these 
activities is accounted for at the cost of production, i.e. through the wage bill. In general, the 
distinction between the wage and the non-wage parts of g turned out to be instrumental for 
the selection of a number of indicators that are related to the real or price parts of g through 
the respective wage and non-wage parts in each case. As example, the evolution of real g is 
related to public employment, and the evolution of the deflator of g is linked to public wages 
per employee. In addition, given the importance of government consumption as a component 
of overall public spending (some 50% in the average OECD economy), we were able to find a 
number of timely-available, direct indicators on nominal budgetary execution. Despite the fact 
that the latter present the problem of being published in non-seasonally adjusted terms, it 
tends to present the best alternative given that provides a direct measure of g in nominal 
terms, even though typically for the central government sector, a choice that might not be 
innocuous for highly fiscally decentralized countries like Germany and Spain. 
After the extensive data search, nevertheless, we constraint ourselves in this study to 
a subset of variables that is available for the four countries under consideration and it is 
broadly homogeneous for all of them. Specifically, the variables included in our analysis cover 
the period 1995Q1-2013Q4 and are the following for each one of the considered cases 
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain): (i) quarterly seasonally-adjusted real government 
consumption, gR; (ii) deflator of quarterly seasonally-adjusted government consumption, gD; 
                                                                            
9 See e.g. Ramey (2011) and the references quoted therein.  
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(iii) proxy to public employment in national accounts, NR (quarterly seasonally-adjusted “non-
market services”); (iv) wages per public employee in national accounts, WP (quarterly 
seasonally-adjusted “non-market services”); (v) Central government consumption expenditure, 
GRP (monthly nominal, non-seasonally adjusted); (vi) Combined index of HICP Health (prices) 
and HICP Education (prices), pP (monthly, non-seasonally adjusted); (vii) Annual planned 
government consumption from the Stability Programmes in real (gRf) and price (gDf) terms. 
3.3 The information flow 
Annual targets taken from the Stability Programmes (SPs) and are assumed to be known in 
the first quarter of the year. This is a reflection of actual publication dates, on average. Indeed, 
before 2010 SPs were published at the very end of the year. Since 2010, nonetheless, SPs 
are published in the course of the first four months of the year, with end of April as the limit, in 
the framework of the so-called European Semester. As regards variables published at the 
monthly frequency, in turn, are typically known shortly after the month ends, while quarterly 
national accounts' data are published with a delay of 90 days. 
3.4 Related literature 
As mentioned above, the literature on fiscal forecasting offers only limited help to frame our 
paper. On the one hand, a strand of articles conceptually related to ours, which were quoted 
in the Introduction, focus on the analysis of the determinants of ex-post budgetary deviations 
(i.e. the difference between actual values and government forecasts), without entering into the 
vagaries of the elaboration of the fiscal forecast. On the other hand, the papers on short-term 
fiscal forecasting, also mentioned above, tend to concentrate on the impact of backward-
looking fiscal information on the fiscal projection, and do not internalize the forward-looking 
targets. Within the literature on short-term macro forecasting few studies deal with individual 
components of GDP. Indeed, GDP is typically forecasted from an aggregate point of view, 
see e.g. Camacho and Pérez-Quirós (2010), or Banbura and Runstler (2007), and the 
references quoted therein. Exceptions are Baffigi et al. (2004), which follow a demand-side 
approach, Hahn and Skudelny (2008), that follow a supply-side approach, or Foroni and 
Marcellino (2013), who look at both sides of GDP. In those papers, nevertheless, g and the 
relevant supply-side counterparts tend to be forecasted by means of univariate methods, or 
considered to be a residual, exogenous variable difficult to model and forecast, and 
considered to be erratic (in this latter regard see also Grassi et al., 2014). Another set of 
papers consider the elaboration of optimal government forecasts with a view to orient the ex-
ante design of policies (see, for early contributions, Johansen, 1972, Granger, 1973, 
Johansen and Hersoug, 1975). Finally, the literature on “restricted forecasting”, as in Gómez 
and Guerrero (2006), focuses on the question of which is the future path of a given model’s 
forecasts that would lead to achieving a given government target. 
3.5 Some stylized facts 
In figures 1 and 3 we present real and price government consumption figures at the annual 
frequency against the corresponding targets for the four countries under study and the period 
2006-2013. For gR (Figure 1) it is apparent that in most of the cases ex-post data (the dotted 
line) were above initial targets (the solid lines). It happens for Spain in all the years and for 
France in all but 2006, while for Germany and Italy this is the case in all years with the 
exception of 2010-2012. Thus, overall, one may say that governments spent more than they 
initially were committed to, i.e presented a pro-spending bias. At the same time, though, over 
time, observed values followed the apparent change in policy in Spain and Italy, countries that 
moved from positive registers of gR over 2006-2009/2010 to (strongly) negative rates of 
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change in 2010-2013. Despite missing the initial targets, it seems that the change in policies 
had a persistent effect on the conduction of actual policies in those countries.  
Interestingly, the overall picture for gD (Figure 3) is broadly the opposite. 
Governments predicted higher public wages and purchases’ prices than recorded ex-post. 
This means that in terms of nominal government expenditure consumption the pro-spending 
bias was somewhat mitigated, leading in some cases to data being in line with initial targets. 
These observations do not need to be contradictory among them. In times of fiscal stress 
governments have incentives to report higher GDP real growth than expected, i.e. to present 
an optimistic bias in their economic forecast, which may be partially achieved by having more 
gR, a component that weights some 20% of the total while they do not have any incentives to 
bias the prices.  
One may ask the question of whether despite the fact that gR targets infra estimated 
actual values, it could be the case that in a framework of peer pressure to put public finances 
under control, some policy actions were taken to change an initially spending-loose course of 
action, once in the public debt-crisis period. This is what we try to answer with the material 
included in figures 2 and 4. In those figures we present forecasts for gR and gD computed on 
the basis of a purely backward-looking model, a second order autoregressive model, AR(2), 
that completely disregards any forward-looking elements of policy not incorporated in the 
inertia of the series themselves. We present forecasts done at the time of the first quarter of 
each year. Focusing on Spain and Italy, the two countries under more close EU-wide peer 
pressure, it is clear from figures 2 and 4 that both gR  and gD tend to present lower growth 
rates than forecast with the AR(2) in Q1 of each year. This is in line with the change of policy 
regime (from positive to negative growth rates) taking place over time and the backward-
looking model only capturing it with some delay. In that sense, we can conclude that, even 
though there is systematic bias in the forecast of gR in some countries, something was done 
in those countries under pressure to change the dynamics of public expenses ex-post. 
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4 The modelling approach 
4.1 The model 
The heterogeneity in the data sources conditions the selection of the modeling approach. As 
briefly discussed above, to enrich the dataset available for forecasting we have to resort to 
monthly/quarterly indicators of the real component of government consumption, its deflator 
component or a mixture of both (nominal). With this in mind we decided to pose a factor 
model with two factors, one for the real part and one for the price part. The details are as 
follows. The model is a factor model, written in a general state-space form as 
ttt
ttt
vhFh
whHY
+×=
+×=
−1
                   (2) 
with RwVar t =)( , and QVar t =)(ν .The vector of observed variables (all demeaned and 
logged) is 
( )DtARtAPtRPtPtRtDtRtt ggpGWNggY ∆∆∆∆∆∆∆∆= ,,,,,,, 4444              
As can be seen, some of the variables are included in quarterly growth rates (first 
differences of the logs) and others in quarterly annual growth rates (4 lags differences of the 
logs of the quarterly series). The transformation chosen depends on the availability of the 
data. Those released seasonally adjusted are included in first differences, while those 
released non-seasonally adjusted are included in fourth differences to avoid the ad-hoc 
choice of a seasonal adjustment procedure. Finally, the two government targets, 
R
tA g∆ and 
D
tA g∆ , are included in annual growth rates, referring to variables in annual frequencies. 
The variables are decomposed into two common driving factors, the real (ρt) and the 
price (πt) factors and an idiosyncratic component that follows an AR(2) structure with 
uncorrelated irregulars. The use of two factors is crucial for the integration of nominal 
variables in the model, and also for the joint use of real and price indicators.  It is important to 
specify carefully which variables are function of the real factor and which are function of the 
nominal factor. In addition, it is worth mentioning that depending of the transformation of the 
variables (first differences, fourth differences or annual), the dynamic relation of the observed 
variable and the underlying factor change. In particular, real government consumption is 
represented by the real factor and the deflator of government consumption by the price factor 
in the following way: 
R
tgt
R
t ug ,1 +=∆ ρδ                   (3) 
D
tgt
D
t ug ,1 +=∆ πθ                        (4) 
This does not mean that a shock to the real factor does not affect the "price" variable 
(and viceversa) because  real and nominal factors are not orthogonal, as it is the case in 
principal components. As regards public employment, RtN4∆ , it is a function only of the real 
factor. The annual growth rate implies that, in a given period t, the relation with the underlying 
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variable –which represents quarterly activity– is the accumulation of the last four periods. 
Therefore:  
( ) R tNttttRt uN ,32124 ++++=∆ −−− ρρρρδ                   (5) 
In turn, wages of public employees depend only on the price factor: 
( ) P tWttttPt uW ,32124 ++++=∆ −−− ππππθ                    (6) 
as well as the combination of the health and education price indexes, that only depends on 
the price factor: 
( ) P tpttttPt up ,32144 ++++=∆ −−− ππππθ                  (7) 
Regarding central government consumption expenditure, it is a nominal variable, and 
therefore it depends on the real and price factors: 
( ) ( ) RPGtttttttttRPt uG ++++++++=∆ −−−−−− 321332134 ππππθρρρρδ             (8) 
Finally, the two government target variables, annual planned government 
consumption in real and price terms, are moving average functions of the real and price 
factors respectively. The assumption is that, once demeaned, ex-ante plans are equal to ex-
post data up to a random disturbance, i.e. 
Rf
t
R
tA
R
tA ugg +∆=∆                 (9) 
Df
t
D
tA
D
tA ugg +∆=∆                (10) 
Thus, once both the observed and the target real/price government consumption 
variables have been computed as deviations from their own means, the historical 
discrepancies estimated between ex-ante targets and ex-post observed data amount to the 
moments of the Dftu and 
Rf
tu random errors.  
Now, given that  




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 ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ −−−−−−
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then, using (3) and (9) yields: 
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R
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R
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R
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       (11) 
and using (4) and (10) allows as to express 
D
tA g∆  as: 
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     (12) 
Equations (3) to (12) and the AR(2) structure of the factors and the idiosyncratic 
shocks configure the structure of the matrices H, F, Q and R in (2). A full description of these 
matrices can be found in Appendix A. The monthly information of some of the indicators is 
transformed into quarterly frequency by calculating in each month the quarterly growth rate. 
The AR(2) structure is assumed to provide the most parsimonious representation of sinusoidal 
impulse response function, as it is already standard in the literature of factor models.  
4.2 Alternative assumptions to model policy targets 
Alternative models will differ in the way they approach (1), (9) and (10) above, i.e. in the way the 
policy targets enter the model. As mentioned above in Section 2, we are interested in three 
basic experiments, which can be described with different assumptions regarding (9) and (10).  
In the first case of interest we set RtA
R
tA gg ∆=∆ , for all years before the current 
year T (the same for the deflator equation), which amounts to assuming that governments 
met their commitments in the past (i.e. 111 0 −×− =Ψ TT  in equation 1). In this way the model 
will treat relations (9) and (10) as almost identities, only different because the time series of 
R
tA g∆  used to estimate the model will have at each time one observation more than
R
tAg∆ , 
namely the one corresponding to the target for the current year T (assigned to the last quarter 
of year T). The intuition for this case is the following: at each forecast origin, the target value 
for year T receives full credibility as if the government had always predicted correctly the 
actual value in the past. Therefore, any given consumption expenditure proposed will receive 
full credit in terms of predictive power on the future value of RtA g∆  (the same applies to the 
government deflator).   
In the second case we do not constraint TΨ , i.e. it is composed of the genuine 
differences between ex-post actual values and ex-ante government targets, and thus the 
estimation of the parameters in (9) and (10) are allowed to reflect the different historical 
accuracy/credibility of the government. In this case targets receive as much credibility as the 
one gained by the government on the basis of its past performance during the sample period. 
The third case is one in which equations (9) and (10) are excluded from the model, 
and thus the forward-looking information provided by the government targets is not taken into 
consideration. This model reflects the best possible forecast of the next realization of 
government consumption growth (real and deflator) made by an agent that takes into account 
all the information available in period t on the actual implementation of government plans and 
assigns zero weight to government announcements. 
4.3 Additional considerations 
First, the empirical exercises that follow are of a pseudo real-time nature. This means that we 
implement counterfactual exercises assuming that the data available today for a past 
year/quarter/month was available at that time, i.e. we disregard the potential impact of data 
revisions in shaping the real-time decisions of policy makers. This approach is dictated by the 
lack of availability of consistent real-time data for our dataset. 
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Second, we use an AR(2) model as a naïve forecasting alternative to our factor 
models. This means that as a minimum we are going to check that the proposed models beat 
this alternative. It is worth mentioning that it is a well-established fact in the relevant 
forecasting literature that autoregressive models are hard-to-beat alternatives (see e.g. Hess 
and Iwata, 1997). 
Third, we take two standard measures of forecasting performance. The standard 
Mean Squared Error, to compare the predictability of the relevant variables across countries, 
as well as the ratio of RMSEs of models to the AR(2) alternative. Diebold and Mariano test is 
employed, to test for the null hypothesis of no difference in the accuracy of two competing 
forecasts. 
Fourth, all the comparisons are going to be made on the basis of a recursive 
forecasting exercise over the forecasting window 2006Q1 to 2013Q4. 
Finally, the model is estimated by maximum likelihood using the Kalman Filter as 
expressed in equation (2) where the matrices H, F, Q and R are shown in the Appendix. The 
procedure to deal with mixed frequencies, ragged ends and missing observations come from 
Mariano and Murasawa (2003) where missing observations are substituted with draws from a 
normal distribution and the model is estimated as a model with time varying coefficients in the 
Kalman filter, depending on the number of missing observations in each period of time, 
Details of the estimation can be found in Mariano and Murasawa (2003) or Camacho and 
Pérez-Quirós (2010). 
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5 Empirical results 
The main results of the paper are shown in tables 1 and 2, on the one hand, and figures 5, 6 
and 7, on the other.  
In Table 1 we present the forecast accuracy statistics: MSE, ratio of RMSE and DM 
for one quarter-ahead forecasts. The following results are worth highlighting: 
(i) According to the MSEs (first column of results in the table), there are strong 
differences in the predictability across countries. Countries as France are 
relatively easy to forecast (e.g. the MSE for real government consumption 
forecasts for the best model stands at 0.04) because the dynamics are very 
stable over time, while countries as Spain, subject to strong changes in 
fiscal policies are difficult to predict (e.g. the MSE for real government 
consumption forecasts for the best model stands at 2.18).  
(ii) The consideration of the short-term information provided by the selected 
indicators is useful to infer short-term developments, as clear from the 
better forecasting performance of Model 3 (no government targets), versus 
the AR(2), that only uses information on the dynamics of government 
consumption (see columns "Ratio of RMSE" and "Diebold Mariano test"). 
This is true for all countries when forecasting real and nominal government 
growth. The results for the deflator are more erratic and, in general, there is 
no gain with respect to the AR(2) dynamics. This first result is very 
important, to the light of the literature mentioned above on the “erraticity” of 
public spending forecasting. However we show here that there is room for 
short term modelling using indicators and this result is robust across 
countries. 
(iii) The inclusion of targets is not helpful to infer the current situation of 
ongoing plans, as judged by the 1-quarter-ahead forecasting capabilities of 
the different models; indeed, Model 3 is not beaten by Model 1 or Model 2. 
This is a strong result. There is no gain in using full-year government plans 
to infer the implementation of fiscal plans in the current quarter (bear in 
mind that 1-q-ahead forecasts, given our timing convention, are in fact 
backcasts). The intuition of the results for Model 1 is different than the one 
for Model 2. In the case of Model 1 (imperfect past credibility) the intuition is 
easy. If there is a succession of government plans for the whole year with 
different degrees of credibility, that are usually not successful to infer the 
degree of implementation of the plan in the current quarter, the model 
endogenously does not take those predictions into consideration, implying 
a zero weight to those official government forecast, producing forecasts 
that are non-distinguishable from the “no government targets” specification. 
More complicated is the intuition of the results of the model Model 2 
(perfect past credibility). The results are the worst, even though we give full 
credibility to whole-year government plans. In every period of time, we 
assume that the forecast of the government is the best possible one. It is 
as good that we give the maximum credibility assuming that the forecast is 
the future observation of an annual sequence where the forecast of the 
government is equal to the realized value. Therefore, our sequence of “past 
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forecasts” has a very high weight in the future estimated values for the 
realizations of government consumption real and nominal. The problem is 
that this maximum weight is misleading because systematically, 
governments are wrong in one direction or another, implying that the 
forecasted values are also incorrect for nowcasting (i.e. 1-quarter-ahead, 
given the information set) forecasts. 
Table 2, in turn, presents the results of the forecasts for the whole year, computed 
from each quarter on a recursive basis. During the first quarter of the year the forecast 
requires nowcasting and one, two and three periods ahead forecast. The second quarter 
requires nowcasting and one and two periods ahead, the third quarter requires nowcasting 
and one period ahead forecast and the fourth quarter is only nowcasting. For whole-year 
forecasts we have also added an alternative model "Model 4" that simply takes as such the 
government target for the whole year, i.e. from each forecast origin (quarter) the forecast for 
the whole year according to this model is always the government target as such. 
As in the case of Table 1, there are also marked differences among MSEs between 
countries, in particular, both the real government consumption and the deflator are more 
easily predicted in Germany and France, and to a lesser extent Italy for Rtg , than in the case 
of Spain. This makes it hard for the different models to beat the benchmark alternative (AR(2) 
model). However, in the case of countries subject to "fiscal scrutiny", as in the case of Spain, 
the three modeling alternatives (models 1, 2 and 4 in the table) beat the AR(2) (as shown in 
the ratios of the second column of results of Table 2 and the DM tests). This initial result 
reflects the differences among countries in the policy stance. Indeed, in the case of Spain 
there was a change in policy (from fiscal expansion to fiscal consolidation) that gives some 
explanatory role to the short-term information but also to the targets. At medium horizon (2-3 
quarters) there is some anchoring from the targets, that, even though, as we saw in Table 1, 
does not necessarily help us to forecast in the nowcasting arena, it gives some idea on the 
changes in trends that diminish dramatically the estimated errors. Thus, the main result of 
Table 2 is that policy targets add information beyond the inertia of g, which is valuable at 
times of policy changes (of particular interest is the case of Spain). 
This result is reinforced by Figure 5 in which we dissect forecasts of Rtg∆ by forecast 
origin, showing forecast errors in this case, making clear how targets are useful especially at 
the beginning of the year, when little information is known about actual policies. Focusing on 
the case of Spain again, the “perfect past credibility” alternative performs better at forecast 
origins in Q1 and Q2 (first two pannels in each row of the figure), given that the information 
content on annual changes of observed data quarterly data is quite low, a fact that is clear 
when inspecting the lines corresponding to Model 3 (no targets) in particular in Q1 and for the 
years 2009-2012. As regards Model 1 projections (“imperfect past credibility”), they lie in 
between the other two alternatives. As the government starts implementing the g plans (at 
least partially) in the successive quarters, the deviations displayed by the Model 1 and Model 
3 alternatives get reduced, while at the same time Model 2 forecasts become less adaptive as 
they pose a significant weight on annual policy targets. At the end of the year, when the 
forecast horizon is Q4, forecast of Model 2 almost coincides with the target (for all the 
countries), even though, according to our timing convention only Q3 figures for Rtg and the 
quarterly indicators are known so that the information set is far for being complete. 
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The latter point appears to be clearer in figures 6 and 7 where we look at the same 
information from the angle of iterative forecasts, i.e. we show how models learn and adapt 
throughout the year to new incoming information. In the figure we show the annual rate of 
growth of real government consumption (solid line), the annual targeted rate of growth (dotted 
line) and the sequence of forecasts for the whole year (annual growth rate) produced taking 
as forecast origin each quarter of the year. The “no targets” (Model 3) and “imperfect past 
credibility” (Model 1) alternatives tend to approach the final outcome in a monotonous way, 
more quickly in the second case as the target convey useful information on the direction of 
change of Rtg∆ . On the other hand, as regards the case with “perfect past credibility” (Model 
2), the learning process is even faster at the beginning of the year in the cases of the years in 
which the target is informative, but then as the quarters goes by, it ends up inheriting the 
“policy bias” of the target. 
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6 Conclusions 
We show that ex-ante government targets may convey useful information about ex-post 
policy developments in certain circumstances, in particular when policy changes drastically, 
even when past policy credibility is low, and when there is limited information about the 
implementation of plans (e.g. at the beginning of a fiscal year). In addition, our models are 
instrumental to unveil the current course of policy in real-time. Our approach complements 
and qualifies a well-established branch of the literature that finds politically-motivated biases in 
policy targets.  
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Tables and charts. 
Table 1. Unveiling g plans for the current year (T): one-quarter-ahead forecasts 
 
GERMANY 
 
FRANCE 
 
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.41 0.96 -0.44
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
2.30 2.27 1.91 1.95
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.36 0.90 -1.76 -0.77 -1.99
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.19 0.97 -0.31
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.93 2.16 2.13 2.19
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.21 1.03 0.51 0.53 -2.06
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.66 0.96 -0.31
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
1.57 1.49 1.93 2.40
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.57 0.90 -1.75 -0.69 -2.34
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
DE
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.04 1.01 0.09
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
2.06 6.94 2.02 2.02
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.04 0.99 -0.67 -0.15 -2.02
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.02 1.26 1.79
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.28 4.58 3.16 3.05
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.01 0.95 -1.11 -2.38 -3.18
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.05 0.95 -0.50
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
2.02 6.18 2.06 2.07
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.05 0.96 -1.05 0.20 -2.07
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
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Table 1 (cont’d). Unveiling g plans for the current year (T):  
one-quarter-ahead forecasts 
 
ITALY 
 
SPAIN 
 
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.27 1.04 0.82
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
3.66 3.83 1.95 1.94
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.23 0.96 -1.93 -1.58 -1.97
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
7.26 1.45 1.65
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
15.08 2.09 1.31 1.06
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 3.19 0.96 -0.34 -2.18 -1.39
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
7.79 1.38 1.54
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
22.67 2.36 1.80 1.65
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 3.62 0.94 -0.61 -2.13 -1.90
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
2.18 0.88 -1.90
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
10.20 1.89 1.69 1.82
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 2.36 0.91 -1.62 0.83 -1.79
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
2.26 0.97 -0.41
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
6.24 1.62 1.78 1.75
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 2.20 0.96 -0.66 -0.32 -1.75
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
5.20 0.96 -0.57
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
9.41 1.29 1.54 1.88
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 4.88 0.93 -1.42 -0.58 -1.94
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
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Table 2. The role of policy targets and incoming-data in the anticipation  
of the yearly outcome of real government consumption 
 
GERMANY 
 
FRANCE 
 
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.32 0.93 -0.49
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.71 1.39 3.58 3.25
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.32 0.93 -1.27 -0.01 -3.59
Model 4. Government targets (T) 1.19 1.80 4.09 4.20 4.20 4.12
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.16 0.90 -0.58
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.14 0.86 -0.68 -0.31
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.25 1.14 2.19 1.21 1.17
Model 4. Government targets (T) 0.20 1.02 0.12 0.90 2.69 -0.50
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.33 0.75 -1.00
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.49 0.92 -0.47 1.98
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.52 0.95 -0.87 0.83 0.17
Model 4. Government targets (T) 0.75 1.14 0.68 3.92 2.69 0.92
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.08 1.11 0.50
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.48 2.74 3.41 3.83
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.06 0.98 -1.21 -0.61 -3.42
Model 4. Government targets (T) 0.50 2.77 3.62 4.04 0.77 3.64
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.05 1.04 0.39
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.12 1.63 2.24 2.71
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.04 0.91 -0.91 -2.19 -2.97
Model 4. Government targets (T) 0.08 1.37 1.55 1.69 -1.98 2.36
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.11 0.94 -0.32
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
0.45 1.87 2.56 3.44
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.11 0.93 -0.90 -0.08 -2.98
Model 4. Government targets (T) 0.46 1.90 2.58 3.53 0.80 3.01
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
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Table 2 (cont’d). The role of policy targets and incoming-data in the anticipation  
of the yearly outcome of real government consumption 
 
ITALY 
 
SPAIN 
 
 
  
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.54 1.00 0.00
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
1.01 1.37 1.89 1.81
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 0.48 0.95 -2.11 -0.44 -2.20
Model 4. Government targets (T) 1.08 1.42 1.76 1.90 0.69 2.04
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
4.77 2.03 1.45
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
1.46 1.13 0.44 -1.35
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 1.68 1.21 1.24 -1.47 0.28
Model 4. Government targets (T) 2.91 1.59 1.63 -0.97 1.79 1.37
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
5.71 1.51 1.18
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
3.07 1.11 0.57 -0.96
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 2.83 1.06 0.64 -1.26 -0.24
Model 4. Government targets (T) 5.19 1.44 1.75 -0.24 2.00 1.72
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
AR(2) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
1.18 0.62 -2.05
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
1.23 0.64 -1.47 0.12
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 2.23 0.86 -2.11 1.84 1.10
Model 4. Government targets (T) 2.70 0.94 -0.32 2.39 3.09 0.58
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
0.88 0.69 -1.96
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
1.51 0.90 -0.53 2.14
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 2.23 1.10 0.53 1.29 0.59
Model 4. Government targets (T) 1.27 0.83 -0.77 1.08 -1.17 -0.76
Model 1. Imperfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf ≠ ∆ gtR, for t< T) (IP_IF)
2.62 0.61 -1.91
Model 2. Perfect past credibility                                                             
(∆ gtRf = ∆ gtR, for t< T) (PP_IF)
2.34 0.58 -1.63 -0.42
Model 3. No government targets (NoT) 6.00 0.92 -0.97 1.94 1.63
Model 4. Government targets (T) 1.62 0.48 -1.62 -0.90 -1.30 -1.63
DIEBOLD MARIANO TEST
REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
DEFLATOR OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
NOMINAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
MSE
RATIO OF RMSE 
TO AR(2)
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Figure 1.  
Bias in real government consumption targets (% growth rates). 
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Figure 2.  
The predictability of real government consumption: the figure presents forecast produced  
with the model tttt ggg ζρρα +++= −− 2211 estimated with the information available in the first quarter 
of each year (% growth rates). 
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Figure 3.  
Bias in the price component of government consumption targets (% growth rates). 
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Figure 4.  
The predictability of the price component of government consumption: the figure presents forecast  
produced with the model tttt ggg ζρρα +++= −− 2211 estimated with the information available 
 in the first quarter of each year (% growth rates). 
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Figure 5.  
The role of the budgetary target in model projections of real government consumption: the figure presents  
forecast errors committed by each model from each forecast origin (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) (% growth rates). 
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Figure 6.  
The evolution of the iterative real government consumption forecasts during the year  
(“learning”): Germany and France (% growth rates). 
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Notes. Model 1: Imperfect past credibility; Model 2: Perfect past credibility; Model 3: No government targets. 
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Figure 7.  
The evolution of the iterative real government consumption forecasts during the year 
 (“learning”): Italy and Spain (% growth rates). 
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Notes. Model 1: Imperfect past credibility; Model 2: Perfect past credibility; Model 3: No government targets. 
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APPENDIX A. Full Description of the Kalman Filter Matrices 
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